Firms with high shares of workers on fixed-term contracts tend to have higher sales of imitative new products but perform significantly worse on sales of innovative new products ("first on the market"). High functional flexibility in "insideroutsider" labor markets enhances a firm's new product sales, as do training efforts and highly educated personnel. We find weak evidence that larger and older firms have higher new product sales than do younger and smaller firms. Our findings should be food for thought to economists making unqualified pleas for the deregulation of labor markets.
Introduction
In recent years, studies on the determinants of innovative behavior in Europe have been encouraged by the increasing availability of firm-level data through the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The emerging literature has focused on determinants of innovation such as market structure, firm size, knowledge spillovers, R&D collaboration, conditions for the appropriation of innovation benefits, and others. This article will address a factor that has not been covered in CIS studies: what is the influence of the increased flexibility of labor on innovation?
Over the last decades, many labor market economists repeatedly argued that high European unemployment should be reduced by making labor markets more flexible. An example is the OECD's Jobs Study (1994) . The Jobs Study has been followed by a literature that tries to substantiate that more flexible labor markets would not only help against unemployment, but may also allow for higher economic growth and higher productivity gains (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) . While such studies have been quite influential in policy discussions, the empirical underpinning of such policy statements is far from strong. The impact of flexible labor contracts on innovation or productivity growth is still under-researched. We agree with a recent plea by Freeman (2005) that there is a need for micro-level studies, as evidence from aggregate data is far from convincing. There are only a few firm-level studies, including Laursen and Foss (2003) , Michie and Sheehan (2003) , Arvanitis (2005) , Kleinknecht et al. (2006) , and Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2009) . This is regrettable, as labor relations and human resources have been suggested to have a significant impact on innovation through their influence on knowledge processes (Amabile et al., 1996; Guest, 1997; Trott, 1998) .
Besides discussing theoretical arguments, this study makes an empirical contribution to our sparse knowledge about the impact of flexible labor on innovation using firm-level data from several subsequent surveys with broad industry coverage in the Netherlands. Our database covers a "direct" measure of innovation: sales performance of new or improved products, introduced during the past 2 years. We take advantage of the fact that there is a wide spectrum of typical labor contract patterns in the Netherlands (and in our database). A number of Dutch firms still have fairly rigid "Rhineland" labor relations, while others have highly flexible "Anglo-Saxon" practices in easy hiring and firing. "Rhineland" firms typically offer their personnel fair protection against dismissal and long-term commitments. "Anglo-Saxon" firms employ, at a significant scale, labor on fixed-term contracts, labor hired from employment agencies or freelance workers, which allows them to quickly adapt to changing demand conditions by easy hiring and firing. 1 We trust that the wide spectrum of "Rhineland" versus "Anglo-Saxon" labor contracts in the Netherlands allows for a meaningful study of the possible impact of flexible labor on innovation performance. This article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief sketch of the theoretical background and discusses our hypotheses; Section 3 describes our data and the empirical model; Section 4 reports the regression results; and Section 5 rounds up with conclusions.
Patterns of flexible labor and innovation
Labor market flexibility can be subdivided into three types of flexibility: (i) numerical flexibility, (ii) functional flexibility, and (iii) wage flexibility (e.g. Beatson, 1995; Michie and Sheehan, 2003; Arvanitis, 2005; Kleinknecht et al., 2006) . 2 Our database does not allow analyzing wage flexibility. 3 This article is confined to analyzing numerical (or "external") flexibility and functional (or "internal") flexibility. Numerical flexibility allows for easy hiring or firing of personnel which can result in significant reductions of a firm's wage bill. 4 High numerical flexibility is at the core of the "Anglo-Saxon" model of labor relations. Functional flexibility is the ability of firms to reallocate labor in their internal labor markets, relying on training that allows personnel to carry out a wider range of tasks (e.g. Beatson, 1995) . Functional flexibility reflects the multiple competencies of workers, such as multi-skilling, multi-tasking, cooperation, and the involvement of workers in decision-making (Arvanitis, 2005) . Functional (or "internal") flexibility is characteristic of the "Rhineland" model of labor relations, providing opportunities for long-term careers in the same firm. Such long-term commitments may be interpreted as an investment in the trust, loyalty and commitment of individuals.
Many mainstream economists tend to be in favor of more flexible, "Anglo-Saxon" labor markets. In a traditional microeconomics view, markets can never be flexible enough. Adherents of more (externally) flexible labor markets have proposed a number of arguments in favor of more numerical flexibility.
First, long-tenured employees may become conservative, being attached to outdated products and processes, and reluctant to adapt to significant changes due to "lock-in" effects (Ichniowski and Shaw, 1995) . Second, labor market rigidity may reduce the reallocation process of labor from old and declining to newly emerging industries, and the difficulty of firing personnel might frustrate labor-saving process innovations (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002; Scarpetta and Tressel, 2004 ; see also Nickell and Layard, 1999) . Third, with strong protection against dismissal, labor may become too powerful, increasing the chance that monopoly profits from innovation will be (partly) absorbed through higher wage claims. Monopoly profits from innovation are a reward for taking innovative risks; such risk-taking would be 2 For a detailed discussion of different forms of labor market flexibility, see e.g. Wilthagen and Tros (2004) . 3 A treatment of wage (in-) flexibility in the context of insider-outsider labor markets can be found in Bentolila and Dolado (1994) and Sánchez and Toharia (2000) . 4 Sánchez and Toharia (2000) report that high proportions of flexible workers reduce the probability that a firm will pay high efficiency wages to insiders. Bentolila and Dolado (1994) also argue that hiring of flexible workers may bring down wages as long as the share of flexible workers increases (as a composition effect). As soon as this share stabilizes, however, wages may actually rise again since flexibility at the margin (without affecting core workers) increases the power of insiders to raise wage unit costs. As a result, employment effects of flexible work are uncertain.
Flexible labor and innovation performance discouraged if labor could claim part of the premium. Powerful labor, negotiating wage contracts at the firm level, could therefore "hold up" investments in innovation (Malcomson, 1997) . Finally, more flexibility would also allow for easier replacement of less productive personnel by more productive people and the threat of firing might prevent shirking. Besides, easier hiring and firing could help keeping wages low, as is evidenced by estimates of wage equations.
5 Moreover, as has recently been emphasized by Arvanitis (2005) , firms can more effectively fulfill their demands for specialized services by making use of temporary work. A number of the above arguments need to be taken seriously. The first argument hints to "lock-in" due to sunk costs of past investment in education. However, such "lock-in" might be overcome by efficient "life-long learning" arrangements, i.e. by good HRM policies. The second argument is less convincing, as newly emerging industries are likely to pay better wages and offer better career opportunities than do old and declining industries. One would therefore expect labor to shift voluntarily (if qualifications allow for), in spite of strong firing protection. The third argument is relevant in systems of de-centralized wage bargaining in typical "Anglo-Saxon" countries, but less relevant to "Old Europe" where wages tend to be bargained at industry level (the outcomes of the bargain often being imposed on all firms in the industry). Such "rigidities" help protecting monopoly profits from innovation against rent-seeking trade unions while forcing technological laggards to modernize their equipment. The fourth argument is a case of "fallacy of composition": it might hold at firm level but does not hold at macro level, assuming that fired people will bring down productivity in their next job. Moreover, it seems to be poor HRM policy, trying to prevent shirking by the permanent threat of firing. Certainly, the argument by Arvanitis (2005) about flexible hiring of specialized services as a support to innovation needs to be taken seriously.
In our view, the following counterarguments against high numerical flexibility are relevant: first, high numerical flexibility may weaken a firm's historical memory and continuity of learning. Under flexible hiring and firing, and high external labor turnover, the concept of the "learning organization" may be under pressure. Second, more frequent job changes may reduce employees' loyalty and commitment, resulting in easier leakage of knowledge to competitors; such externalities will discourage investment in R&D. Third, Naastepad and Storm (2006) have shown that (growing) flexibility in labor relations in OECD countries lead to a significant growth in management bureaucracies as there is more need for monitoring and control of disloyal behavior. They illustrate that thicker management layers are associated with lower productivity growth. Fourth, the argument that high numerical flexibility will make 5 Kleinknecht et al. (2006) give evidence from individual-level as well as firm-level wage equations that flexible personnel earn lower hourly wages, and that firms with high shares of flexible personnel pay lower wages. Similar evidence from individual-level wage equations has been reported by Booth et al. (2002) , McGinnity et al., (2004) ; Sànchez and Toharia (2000) , or Ségal and Sullivan (1995). it difficult for firms to store innovative knowledge is particularly relevant for firms that have a "routinized" Schumpeter II innovation regime (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995) . In a Schumpeter II regime, the path-dependent historical accumulation of knowledge is critical to superior product and process performance. This argument gains more weight if some of the accumulated knowledge is "tacit." Other than documented and codified knowledge, "tacit" knowledge is ill-documented and idiosyncratic, as it is based on personal experience (Polanyi, 1966) . Accumulation of such knowledge is favored by a longer tenure in the same firm. This makes insider-outsider labor markets attractive to employers.
Fifth, in a Schumpeterian perspective, one can argue that, due to their monopoly rents from innovation, innovators are better able than technological laggards to live with high adjustment costs due to stricter regulation. In other words, wage cost saving de-regulation may enhance the chance of survival of weak firms. This may weaken the average quality of entrepreneurship as it hampers the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction in which innovators compete away technological laggards (Kleinknecht, 1998) . Sixth, shorter job durations may discourage investments in firm-sponsored training. 6 In highly flexible labor markets, employees may be interested in acquiring general knowledge that increases their employability elsewhere, but they may be reluctant to acquire firm-specific knowledge (e.g. studying safety instructions) if they anticipate a short stay in the firm. Seventh, while adherents of flexible labor markets emphasize that difficult firing of redundant personnel would frustrate labor-saving innovations, it can also be argued that personnel who are easy to fire have strong incentives to hide information about how their work can be done more efficiently. This can be damaging to productivity growth as far as the management is dependent on their personnel's "tacit" knowledge to efficiently implement labor-saving process innovations (see Lorenz, 1999) . Moreover, against the argument that well-protected workers will be more easily shirking, Bentolila and Dolado (1994) observe that ". . . fixed-term workers may exert less effort than permanent employees, given that they expect to be fired anyway." (p. 69). They add, however, that this argument may backfire if fixed-term workers work harder as they hope being promoted to permanent positions. Finally, easy firing may change power relations in a firm. Personnel on the shop floor are less likely to criticize powerful (top) managers. Poor critical feedback from the shop floor may favor problematic management practices. Given the opposing theoretical arguments pertaining to numerical flexibility, it is interesting to look at empirical findings. Two recent studies using UK firm-level data show a negative correlation between numerical flexibility and innovation Sheehan, 1999, 2001) . Similar results are reported by Chadwick and Cappelli (2002) from US data. Arvanitis (2005) reports mixed results. In one of his specifications, he finds that temporary work has a positive impact on innovation, which he ascribes to the need to hire specialists on a temporary basis for the R&D process. When using part-time work as another indicator of flexible labor, he finds a significantly negative impact on innovation. His general conclusion is that ". . . firms with high productivity are those which apply new forms of workplace organization but do not engage many part-time and temporary workers" (Arvanitis, 2005 (Arvanitis, : 1010 . Earlier work by Bentolila and Dolado (1994) , however, raised serious doubts about the use of part-time work as an indicator for flexibility, stating that part-time work does not have the same effects as temporary work. Given that the results by Arvanitis are not clear-cut, we shall also test whether there is a nonlinear relationship, using quadratic terms of numerically flexible labor.
While the impact on innovation of numerical flexibility is doubtful, Arvanitis does find a positive impact on productivity and innovation for several of his indicators of functional flexibility. Similar results have been found by others Sheehan, 1999, 2001; Chadwick and Cappelli, 2002; Kleinknecht et al., 2006) . High functional flexibility in internal labor markets reflects a firm's ability to organize flexibly without destroying loyalty and commitment by firing. This is likely to reduce positive externalities through the exit of trained people or through disloyal behavior (e.g. the leaking of trade secrets to competitors). Furthermore, high functional flexibility can reduce communication barriers between different departments. Better sharing and transfer of knowledge across departments can favor innovation. We therefore expect high functional flexibility to result in better innovation performance.
Data, variables, and methodology
We use longitudinal firm-level data collected by the Organization for Strategic Labor Market Research (OSA) in the Netherlands. Since 1988, OSA has built an enterprise panel in all sectors of manufacturing, services, agriculture, and in non-commercial services, including the government sector. In fact, OSA samples all organizations in the Netherlands that employ personnel, with a minimum of five people, stratified by industries and firm size classes. The database provides information about the labor force (e.g. inflow, outflow, type of contract, internal mobility), as well as about R&D and new products sales. Since 1989, the survey has been conducted for every 2 years. Organizations taking part in a previous survey are also included in the next survey. New organizations are added to each wave in order to compensate for sample fall-out (see Appendix Table A1 ). Data collection is performed using a combination of questionnaire-based face-to-face interviews and a questionnaire to be filled in by managers and returned by mail.
We construct a longitudinal dataset that includes dependent variables in year t and lagged independent variables in year t-2, the latter coming from the previous survey. Merging two consecutive survey waves leads to substantial loss of observations, due to attrition from the panel. We pool 4 "merged" waves (1993-1995, 1995-1997, 1997-1999, and 1999-2001) into our final dataset as information from earlier surveys is not fully comparable. In doing so, we can exploit the longitudinal character of the data, without using panel data techniques that could be problematic because of high attrition.
Furthermore, we estimate our models on the total sample as well as on a subsample of 929 commercial SMEs with less than 250 employees. Restriction to SMEs has the advantage of a more homogeneous sample. We confine our sample to four business sectors, i.e. manufacturing (SBI 15-37), construction (SBI 45), trade (SBI 50-52) and (other) services (SBI 55, and SBI 77) . We exclude government and other non-commercial organizations.
Our database allows the use of a "direct" indicator of product innovation; i.e. sales of new (or significantly improved) products and/or services. It is similar to the "innovation output" indicator in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) database. There are only two deviations of the OSA questionnaire from the CIS concept as described in the OECD Oslo Manual (2005). First, the CIS asks for new or improved products introduced during the past 3 years, while OSA covers the past 2 years. Second the CIS distinguishes products that are "new to the firm" from those that are "new to the market," whereas OSA only asks for the former. We interpret products "new to the firm" as "imitative" innovations, and products "new to the market" as "true" innovations. As in the CIS, innovation performance in our OSA database is measured by asking respondents to subdivide their present product range into three types of product:
1. Products that remained largely unchanged during the past 2 years; 2. Products that were incrementally improved during the past 2 years; and 3. Products that were radically changed or introduced as entirely new products during the past 2 years.
Subsequently, respondents are asked to report the share of these three types of product in their last year's total sales. As our dependent variable, we use the logs of new product sales per employee introduced during the past 2 years; when using logs, this variable conforms better to a normal distribution. Constructing this variable, we add up categories (2) and (3), i.e. incremental and radical innovations. One should note that the new product sales under (2) and (3) need to be novel in that they include new technological knowledge; at least, they should be based on novel (and creative) combinations of existing technological knowledge, the latter being most relevant in the service industries. As mentioned earlier, the data do not allow us to distinguish "imitative" innovations ("new to the firm") from "true" innovations ("new to the market"). Only the 2001 survey provides information on novelty. It comes as no surprise that only a smaller portion of the innovating firms have Flexible labor and innovation performance products that are "new to the market" (Table 1) . In other words, our indicator of new product sales is dominated by "imitative" innovations. We evaluate the evidence on "new to the market" innovations in a separate estimate. Our most important independent variables are numerical flexibility and functional flexibility. We use two indicators of numerical flexibility: annual external labor turnover (i.e. percentages of people that joined or left the firm during the last year) and percentages of people on fixed-term contracts (hired directly by the firm). The correlation tables in the appendix show that the two indicators are weakly correlated; fortunately, our robustness checks with the multivariate analyses below indicate that this is not disturbing. Annual external labor turnover is measured by the maximum value of either the share of newly hired people or the share of people that left the firm in the past year. We also made robustness checks, using, e.g. the sum of people that left or joined the firm. This changed our results very little. We expect both indicators of numerical flexibility to have positive impacts on innovation performance until an optimum point, thereafter turning negative. We try to capture such nonlinear effects by the inclusion of quadratic terms. Our indicator of functional (or "internal") flexibility is measured by the percentage of employees that changed their function and/or department within the firm during the past year. We expect functional flexibility to have a positive impact on innovation performance.
Control variables
We use the following control variables, which are described in more detail in Appendix Table A2: 1. Quality of human capital. This is measured by the percentage of employees with university or higher professional education degrees and by the percentage of employees who participated in training. Human capital is an important production factor for economic growth (Griliches, 1997) . Some consider knowledge diffusion that takes place via individual mobility even of key importance to the innovation process (OECD, 1996) . Micro-level studies also indicate that highly educated people can adapt more quickly to a changing environment, thus contributing to better business performance (Holzer, 1987; Becker and Huselid, 1992; Galende and Suarez, 1999) . Furthermore, formal and informal training can enhance an employee's development and is likely to contribute positively to organizational outcomes and innovation (Russell et al., 1985; Bartel, 1994; Knoke and Kalleberg, 1994; Laursen and Foss, 2003) . We thus expect both of these variables to have positive impacts on innovation performance. 2. R&D intensity as a proxy of inputs to the innovative process. 3. The logarithm of firm size. The relationship between firm size and a firm's innovation performance is inconclusive. On the one hand, small firms have little bureaucracy, short communication lines, and dedicated management by their owners. On the other hand, strong dependence on the owner as a key figure can also have disadvantages. Moreover, small firms often suffer from a lack of (financial) resources and access to technological knowledge (see Tidd et al., 2006) . A major disadvantage of small firms is that they can hardly reduce risks by means of a diversified portfolio of innovative projects. 4. The logarithm of firm age. The impact of firm age on innovation is again ambiguous. Young firms may have highly dedicated and flexible management and they can be more ambitious in innovation, as there is no internal resistance by vested interests in older product lines. Their innovation performance may, however, suffer from lack of experience with innovation (van de Panne et al., 2003) . As far as innovative activities take advantage of accumulated technological knowledge and of management experience from the past (Tidd et al., 2006) , firms with a longer innovation history might use their R&D more efficiently. 5. Export intensity. The causal relationship between export and innovation is bidirectional. Innovation stimulates exports performance (Posner, 1961; Vernon, 1966) . Endogenous growth and new trade theories, however, emphasize that export stimulates investment in R&D as operations on export markets give better access to international knowledge spillovers through flows of ideas and/ or goods (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1998) . Hughes (1988) reports empirical evidence on the simultaneous relationship between export and R&D at sector level; evidence of a simultaneous relationship at the firm level has been reported by Kleinknecht and Oostendorp (2002) . Using export shares in total sales lagged by 2 years, we try to mitigate the endogeneity problem. 6. Industry average of new product sales. A firm's score on new product sales crucially depends on the typical length of the product life cycle in its sector of principal activity. Obviously, a sector like ICT with short product life cycles will have higher sales of products introduced during the past 2 years than sectors with long life cycles, such as aircraft construction. The dependent variable can therefore not be compared across industries unless we correct for life cycle differences. As life cycle data are not easily collected in enterprise surveys, we use, Flexible labor and innovation performance 949 as a substitute, the log of average new product sales in a firm's sector of principal activity. Inclusion of this variable comes down to explaining the deviation of a firm's new product sales from the average of its industry. Besides correcting for typical differences in product life cycles between industries, this variable can also capture other unobserved specifics of industries, such as differences in technological opportunity or in the appropriability of innovation benefits. Not surprisingly, inclusion of this variable made industry dummies insignificant. In our robustness checks, it turned out that a tentative exchange of this variable against industry dummies had little effect on the coefficients of the other variables.
Econometric model
We assume that flexible labor patterns are related to a firm's new product sales as follows:
Here, y (for firm i and year t) denotes the log of "new product sales per employee." We include lagged values of the following independent variables: "NFL" includes variables of numerical flexibility measured by external labor turnover and percentages of people on temporary contract; "FFL" denotes functional flexibility, i.e. the percentages of employees changing function or department within firms; "Con" represents seven control variables; and "Years" represents year dummies. By using 2-year lagged values of independent variables, we reduce potential endogeneity problems.
We use four econometric models on pooled longitudinal data: an OLS model, a Tobit model, a Heckman model, and a Heck-tobit model. As mentioned before, we do not estimate panel data models because of high attrition. A balanced panel covering five waves of data would leave only very few firms. Rather than using one-way error component models or equally complex methods for unbalanced panels (for a survey see Baltagi and Song, 2004) , we use straightforward regression techniques on pooled longitudinal data, correcting for repeated observations (clustering) with robust estimation methods.
First, we use a pooled OLS model (Model 1). This has the disadvantage of sample selection bias since it only includes firms that have positive innovation output. Firms with zero or missing innovation output are excluded (also because of the log transformation), with a possible sample selection bias as a result. In order to correct for selection bias, we have two options, and we use both. First, we use the Tobit model (Model 2). A Tobit model (e.g. Maddala, 1985) corrects for non-normality of the distribution of our dependent variable that is caused by the high probability mass at zero due to firms that have no new product sales. Including firms with no innovation reduces the sample selection bias.
The mathematical representation of a simple Tobit procedure is as follows:
where y Ã i is a latent variable:
Second, we use a Heckman model (Model 3) to correct for item non-response bias. The Heckman model also includes firms that did not report their innovation output, again reducing sample selection bias. In the Heckman model, a selection equation is introduced with a binary variable z (for firm i and year t), which indicates whether the dependent variable (y) is observed or not. The underlying continuous variable is modeled as follows: Heckman selection equation:
where w represents the independent variables listed in the linear equation [equation (1)] and an instrumental variable. We choose for the latter a variable that measures a firm's sensitivity to economic fluctuations. The latter does not correlate with the error terms in the linear equation, but does have a significant impact on the propensity to innovate in the selection equation. This instrumental variable thus ensures the identification of the Heckman model (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 2003) . Finally, we also use a Heck-tobit model (Model 4) to control for both aforementioned possible selection biases. We first formally test for sample selection bias using a Heckman two-step procedure and generate an inverse Mill's ratio (Heckman 1979; Berk, 1983) . This ratio captures the probability of responding to the survey as a function of the variables listed in w of equation (4). We then include this ratio in the Tobit model to statistically control for item nonresponse bias.
Poolability of the data
As a robustness check for our choice of the econometric models, we check formally for the poolability over time. Basically, we want to know whether the parameter estimates vary over time. We perform the Chow test of poolability (Roy-Zellner test) for panel data modified by Roy (1957) and Zellner (1962) . Results of the Roy-Zellner test do reject the null-hypothesis (at 5%) of equal parameters only for the variables such as firm size and the year dummies (see Table 2 ). This suggests that the specification with pooled data and time dummies is justified. The evidence that pooling is largely unproblematic also suggests that a panel data model can be estimated in spite of the relatively high attrition rates in the panel. Table 2 shows that the outcomes of the Roy-Zellner test on the (un-) pooled Tobit specification for all variables.
Results from four regression models
Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix Table A3. Appendix Tables A4 and A5 show the correlations between our independent variables in the total sample and the SME sample. No correlation exceeds 0.5. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) range from 1.03 to 1.21; we thus conclude that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. Tables 3 and 4 present the results of four regression models in the total sample and in the SME sample.
We explain the log of new product sales per employee achieved by firms that have such sales. In other words, our interpretation is strictly confined to innovating firms. The four regression models produce fairly consistent results. It is reassuring that the coefficients proved robust to tentative inclusion or exclusion of various independent variables. An important result in the earlier rounds of our estimates (not documented here) comes from experiments with quadratic terms of our variables on numerical flexibility. Their inclusion had little influence on the other coefficients, and, against our expectations, these quadratic terms proved insignificant throughout. They are therefore omitted from our final version.
Both tables show, as expected, positive coefficients of R&D intensity. The positive effect of export intensity on innovation performance is also highly significant in all versions. It is no surprise that an individual firm's new product sales are heavily related to the average new product sales in its sector of principal activity. Including industry average new product sales implies that our model explains deviations of an individual firm's new product sales from its industry average. The two indicators of human capital (educational achievements and training) have positive impacts on a firm's innovation performance (significant at the 5% level in all four models). This reconfirms the importance of qualified human capital to the innovation process. We find weak evidence (at the 10% level) that older and larger firms might have higher new product sales when considering the total sample (see Table 3 ). When taking SMEs separately, it comes as no surprise that the coefficients for size or age become insignificant (Table 4) .
As expected, high rates of people that change their function or department within the firm ("functional flexibility") contribute positively to new product sales, being significant at 5% level in all four models in both samples. This underlines the importance of "insider-outsider" labor markets for keeping knowledge in the firm and investing in the loyalty and commitment of employees while allowing for flexibility.
Finally, all four models in both samples indicate that a high external labor turnover has no impact on innovation. In three out of four models, however, high shares of employees on temporary contract seem to have a positive impact on innovation performance (significant at the 5% level in the SME sample and at the 10% level in the total sample). This finding supports the argument by Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) discussed earlier, but is hard to reconcile with recent firm-level studies in the Netherlands (Kleinknecht et al., 2006) and in Italy (Lucidi and Kleinknecht, 2009 ) that find a negative impact of numerically flexible labor on labor productivity growth. It is important to keep in mind that two studies using UK firm-level data also show a negative correlation between numerical flexibility and innovation Sheehan, 1999, 2001) , and that similar results are reported by Chadwick and Cappelli (2002) from US data. As mentioned above, Arvanitis (2005) reports mixed results on the topic.
Interpreting our finding of a positive impact of temporary contracts on new product sales, two caveats should be kept in mind. The first qualification is that the screening of personnel is an important motive for employing people on a fixed-term basis. The motive of savings on the wage bill plays only a minor role (3.2%). More than 40% of the temporary contracts in the OSA database serve as a trial period, after which individuals may extend their employment with the firm (Table 5 ). In particular, recent university graduates typically begin their employment on a temporary basis. After a period of good performance, they can expect tenure. In this context, it is interesting to see a correlation between qualified personnel and temporary work (significant at the 5% level) in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. As a second qualification, recall that our dependent variable is heavily influenced by products that are new to the firm, that is by "imitative" rather than "innovative" ("new to the market") products. We cannot distinguish between "imitative" and "innovative" products, except in the survey administered in 2001, which includes a separate question about degrees of novelty. Table 1 showed that the majority of firms that introduce new products are market followers (or imitators) rather than market leaders: 516% of the firms have products that are fully "new to the market." Using these data, we estimated an ordered logit model in Table 6 . The table shows three things: first, firms with high R&D intensities tend to have higher probabilities of introducing products that are "new to the market." Second, the same holds for firms in industries with high shares of new products sales. Third, high percentages of workers on temporary contracts have a negative impact on the probability that a firm's new products will be "new to the market." Similar results hold when we confine the sample to firms with less than 250 workers (not documented here). The finding in Table 6 is opposed to the positive coefficient of temporary contracts in our estimate in Tables 3 and 4 . It appears that the arguments in favor of rigid labor relations mainly hold for the market leaders that undertake substantial R&D efforts. For the larger stream of imitators, more flexible labor relations appear to be more attractive.
Robustness check by random-effects Tobit model
As a robustness check, we estimate a random-effects Tobit regression (see Table 7 ). It turns out that most of our results are fairly robust, both in the total sample and in the SME sample (not documented here). An important exception is the variable "percentage of employees on temporary contract," which still has a positive coefficient but is no longer significant. This indicates that individual effects (i.e. unmeasured attributes of the firm) are correlated with both the "percentage of employees on temporary contract" and "new product sales per employee," our dependent variable (Y). In other words, these individual effects explain both variables. In principle, one could still attribute some of the differences in Y to the "percentage of employees on temporary contract." We cannot say, however, that individual firms should increase or decrease the number of temporary workers as differences in Y are likely to be due to other factors that we do not measure. 
Discussion and conclusions
This article makes an empirical contribution to our sparse knowledge about the impact of flexible labor on innovation, using new product sales as a direct measure of innovation and controlling for factors such as human capital, R&D intensity, export intensity, firm size and age, and industry average new product sales. As opposed to some previous studies, our data allow a 2-year lag between the dependent and independent variables, which we hope will relax the problems of endogeneity that are notorious in this type of analysis. Not surprisingly, R&D intensity, export intensity, high levels of education, and high training efforts all contribute positively to new product sales. As expected, an individual firm's new product sales are heavily related to average sales in its sector of principal activity. We find weak evidence that larger and older firms have higher new product sales than their young and small counterparts. This is hard to reconcile with evidence reported earlier by Acs and Audretsch (1993) . Using new product announcement data, they found that, in many sectors, smaller firms made a disproportionately large contribution to innovative output. Our finding of a weakly significant positive coefficient confirms earlier suggestions that the new product-announcement indicator as used by Acs and Audretsch may be biased if favor of smaller firms (see Kleinknecht et al., 2002; van der Panne, 2004) . It is reassuring to see that our separate estimate among smaller firms (i.e. using a more homogeneous sample) hardly changed our coefficients.
The positive impact of functional flexibility is significant in all four models of both samples and is consistent with previous results by Michie and Sheehan Chadwick and Cappelli (2002) and Arvanitis (2005) . Our findings confirm the important role of functional flexibility in reducing barriers to knowledge sharing and building multiple competencies of employees in internal labor markets. Functional flexibility in "insider-outsider" labor markets allows for flexibility while being socially responsible towards a firm's personnel. The latter might be interpreted as an investment in trust, loyalty and commitment. Such investment is likely to economize on supervision and monitoring costs and reduces the leaking of a firm's knowledge to competitors. Our model is remarkably robust to changes in specifications and in sample size. This also holds for inclusion of nonlinear terms of numerical flexibility variables. Specifications with nonlinear terms are not documented in this article, as these terms all proved insignificant. Intuitively, one might have expected that there is some optimum level of numerical flexibility that would enhance innovation and that beyond the optimum point, flexibility becomes counterproductive. However, the data do not support this.
We find mixed results on numerical flexibility. While one of the proxies of numerical flexibility, external labor turnover, is insignificant in all four models, another proxy, temporary work, has a positive effect on innovation performance, or, being more precise, on "imitative" ("new to the firm") products. As could be seen from Table 1 , most of our firms have sales of products that are "new to the firm" rather than products "new to the market". Their follower strategy may be favored by carefully screening the right personnel through first offering temporary contracts (Table 5 ). The latter seems to be positively related to "imitative" innovations, although the separate random-effects Tobit estimate in Table 7 causes some doubt about this conclusion.
Using the smaller bit of information about the probability of having products "new to the market" (Table 6 ), we find a negative influence of high shares of temporary workers. Hence, the minority of R&D intensive market leaders tends to rely significantly less on flexible work, which is consistent with the findings on Switzerland reported by Arvanitis (2005) . It also underlines the arguments by Lucidi and Kleinknecht (2009) about the need for the continuous accumulation of (tacit) knowledge that is favored by longer commitments of workers to their firms. It appears that the much criticized "rigidity" of insider-outsider labor markets is favorable to R&D intensive market leaders. The results from Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the larger stream of imitators and market followers seem to prefer temporary workers. This interpretation is, however, qualified by the finding from the random-effects Tobit model in Table 7 that shows an insignificant impact of temporary workers on imitative innovation.
Finally, our results warn against the unconditional plea by mainstream economists for the deregulation of labor markets (see e.g. the OECD's Job Study, 1994). It seems that the "rigidity" of insider-outsider labor markets also has advantages, as it allows for "functional" flexibility. The often criticized protection of "insiders" can be Flexible labor and innovation performance 959 interpreted as an investment in the loyalty and commitment of workers. Moreover, functional flexibility on internal labor markets has advantages for the continuity of (organizational) learning, and strengthens the historical memory of firms. Neoclassical economists should note that temporary contracts might have advantages for imitative firms, but definitely are not an option preferred by market leaders who seem to have a greater need for continuity in learning and in preventing knowledge from leaking to competitors. Log (new product sales per employee) The logarithm of turnover from new products 'new to the firm and/or "new to the market" introduced during the past 2 years divided by total employees.
Note that "imitative" innovations ('new to the firm' but already known in the market) are much more numerous than innovations 'new to the market'.
In fact, we measure imitation rather than innovation. 
